I think I disagree with RTL's comment about Americans not realizing that the war expanded in 1778 or that the British faced serious threats elsewhere in the world. I have never read anything AWI that didn't point out the dilema that the French (and others) entry into the war caused the British. The fact that Clinton evacuated Philadelphia was due to the "global war." Not to mention most of the British strategy from then on. Where Americans are in the dark is in the details of what transpired outside the American (or western Hemisphere) theater. I can't say I much care for anything Indian (except the food). :) Without French intervention into the war we could not have won. In spite of this we still could have lost the war which was the only way the British could have won. ..... Geeez ... I just confused myself. :) Mike B

I agree with Mike in that Americans are aware the war broader and more complicated for the British after 1778 because of the Franco-American alliance -- which was sort of the point of the alliance; and I also agree that most Americans don't know the details of what happened beyond our borders. The "global" aspect is taught to us, but the particulars are glossed over. It is nice to have finally have some of the missing picture filled in for me (eg, Gibraltar and Jersey).

I was really talking about the American populace at large - and I speak as someone who has lectured to students from American schools and universities in the UK (whom I would suspect to generally be better educated, given their family backgrounds), rather than those interested in the war like you and Mikeb. Whilst people may be aware of the French becoming involved, I think most of them only think in terms of the French forces in America. Certainly the students were astonished that the British were fighting on several fronts and that it was, in effect, a world war.

True enough. Sooo, does BG! have campaign rules? H.G. Wells observed in Little Wars that units will have a tendency to make unrealistic suicidal attacks when there is no future beyond the immediate battle. Does BG! implement another mechanism to discourage senseless sacrifice? Oh, that raises another question: Gibraltar and Jersey seem like isolated events, were they elements of larger campaigns?

It doesn't, but I'll have a word with Eclaireur and see what he thinks. Well, the siege of Gibraltar lasted four years; there was really only one big sortie by the garrison, but I suppose you could have plenty of "what ifs" with landings etc. I think the French captured Minorca around the same time, so there was a campaign of sorts, but mainly naval. There was more than one assault on Jersey planned by the French, but I think this was the only one that took place. http://members.societe-jersiaise.org/whitsco/wragg0.htm Scroll down to the 1700-1799 section.

With regard to the avoidance of 'senseless sacrifice' in a campaign - how does that fit with the assault(s) on Bunker/Breeds Hill? How much do we really want to discourage it? Campaign rules? Determine the forces available at the beginning of a campaign, and determine a mechanism for possible reinforcements and their possible arrival date, then determine a mechanism for adjusting this to add unpredictability. Determine a 'natural attrition' rate to simulate sickness etc, and a mechanism for variance in this too. Rates will be different for the different combatants. Decide if you will use map based movement or a more random 'encounter generator'. Determine the rate of time lapse between encounters to allow reinforcements to arrive (or not). Keep a log of attrition and casualties. Any losses are not available in further actions. Keep a log of which officers are present in each action and adjust their rating depending on success/failure in actual combat - a points system based on achievement of tactical objectives and a differential between losses and losses inflicted perhaps? Morale factors would also have to follow specific units, so a mechanism for calculating this would also be needed. Decide if supply and logistics will be factored into the morale rating or ignored (or modelled in FULL TECHNICOLOUR!). Something like that??? France is of course only 22 miles away from Britain and by taking-a-tilt at Jersey it became quite necessary for Britain to retain troops in the home islands that could have been elsewhere... apparently* between June and August 1779 the combined French and Spanish fleets had been loitering with the intention of seizing the isle of Wight/Spithead as an anchorage for the 50,000 troops waiting in Le Havre/St Malo... Now; there is a 'what if' for you! (The high command decided Cornwall would be a better landing place even without the benefit of an anchorage and the wind blew unseasonably from the east so it didn't happen) The French/Spanish retook Minorca in 1782 GJ *T A Mahan The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of Ameican Independance (1913) p86-87

GJ, I think Bunker Hill was a one-off, in which the circumstances were very specific, highly atypical, and to a great extent unpredictable (eg the grenadiers halting to fire back instead of continuing their advance, the wrong ammunition for the artillery, the misreading of the rail fence as a more solid obstacle than it actually was, and the presence of Stark - instead of one of the far more common run-of-the-mill duffers - behind the stone wall on the beach). There will be plenty of instances where poor die rolls - especially if I'm involved - will "recreate" this level of loss randomly, without necessarily having to plan for it within the rules, IMO. As regards Franco-Spanish operations against mainland Britain, the Spanish were in charge of the 1778 invasion attempt, having provided most of the ships. There was an earlier field exercise involving the French troops assigned to the invasion, in which the opposing theories of linear and columnar attack were pitted against each other. IIRC, the former (or possibly a pro-linear hybird) prevailed, largely due to the efforts of a chap called Rochambeau, who was later chosen to command the contingent sent to America on the strength of this success. Don't quote me, but I'm sure I read somewhere that the camp set up by Amherst at Coxheath in Kent, to train for repelling any invasion, was the largest single concentration of redcoats (c.30,000 - including militia) in one place, prior to the expedition to Egypt in 1799.

RtL; There will be plenty of instances where poor die rolls - especially if I'm involved - will "recreate" this level of loss randomly, without necessarily having to plan for it within the rules, IMO. I agree fully! The BG! rules create exactly the sort of battle-fog/chaos/unpredictability that abounds in 18thC warfare and consequently this goes a long way to negate the ‘omnipotent’ problem of being-able-to-see-what-is-going-on inherent in a table-top game. You may still be able to see it, but can you respond? The whole feel of the game is ‘Right’; the DP and morale aspect is also particularly fine, the mechanism often results in slow attrition followed by sudden collapse. Charges are also very convincingly dealt with. In reality ‘Suicidal’ attacks do happen regardless of the CinC’s actual intentions and to attempt to adjust the rules to discourage this seems completely unnecessary. The trouble with campaign rules is that they have to be VERY campaign specific, (e.g. sickness rates in the West Indies!), without that they are too general. If the outcome of a battle is not carried forward to the next one in a campaign what you have is a sequence of battles rather than a campaign, BUT you also have to carry forward the effect of what happens between battles. Without the spaces between-the-acts you don’t really have a campaign either. GJ