I started my AWI interest in Southern Campaign in mid 1990s using 1:10 (28mm and Front Rank, and am now slowly moving over to Perry 7 Foundry). GC remains one of my favourites. I like to see GC in 1:10 with full compliment of Br Gds including Gren co and Light co. I came to BG only recently. So I still have some legacy expectations on which I might now need to adapt ( like when as a teenager, the shock of discovering that Br Gds at Waterloo did not wear bearskins !!). So if / when in the company of BG enthusiasts, who may know better than me, I am happy to fall into line with whether they wish 1:20 any specified definitive OOBs. However, when gaming at home or club, I like what I like for OOBs in terms of my (and friends') interpretation of whatever reasonable documentation is available - eg Greg Novak's books, which are quite comprehensive in coverage of battle OOBs for North and South. Whilst i usually seek historical authenticity where possible, I am not an absolute purist and stickler for the last precise detail and soemthings are always open to interpretation. Part of the fun for me, especially for AWI, is interpreting the different possiblilites on OOBs, given that these do not always seem to be precise (eg Camden - estimates on Continentals vary from 900+ to 1200+). So it is possible to be guided by BG definitive OOBs yet flex these according to taste, different interpretations, personal preferences and even alter them for "what if" scenarios, without being a complete heretic. Having felt that I was in a quiet minority, being interested in AWI at this level, yet wanting information, quality standards, support etc, for a period of about 10 years, i was delighted to see the emergence of BG which is extremely helpful and keeps the quality standard very high.

If you want detailed orbats on GCH, the latest in research is found in "Long, Obstinate and Bloody" which go beyond the occasional "rough estimates" in Novak's versions (good though these are) http://www.amazon.com/Long-Obstinate-Bloody-Guilford-Courthouse/dp/0807832669/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1226344437&sr=1-1

I'm happy to say I purchased both a "Devil a Whipping" and "Long, Obstinate and Bloody".I'm in the process of reading the former and so far I'm very pleased and I'm looking forward to the later. :D What I have noticed is that as my grasp of this period gets deeper,I'm sure I will re-read these books for an even deeper appreciation. :wink: I hope Mr.Babits continues on in some other engagements of the war. :)

Interestingly I just received my copy of "Devil of a Whipping" yesterday in the mail. I enjoyed "Long ... " so much I needed to try this book. It is available in paperback and not very expensive. I just have started and am on the third chapter. Stories about you Brits getting 'whupped' in the AWI are pretty rare. I just had to have this one. :) Mike B

I knew I could count on you for an educated reply. :) I won't try and argue with you as I feel I'd be punching above my weight class,but I will attempt to answer in some fashion if nothing for a nice conversation. Plus,when I present the devil's advocate I'm also seeking your opinion and perspective.:) The opinion was the author's and he gave some nice reasons he felt the way he did and he can answer far better then I ever could. :wink: This is not a new theory, but IMO it is flawed because of a widespread mis-reading of comparative British and American casualties (which tended to favour the latter for several reasons) and a few exceptional events. Perhaps,but casualties are caused by bayonets as well(a frequent method of the british) and artillery,unless of course your speaking only in terms of musket ball wounds and then I would need to read this study of course. 1) The British were usually attacking - often after a lengthy march and/or few rations, as at Cowpens and GCH - and were therefore exposed to a greater volume of fire. Their own volley was usually delivered after a rapid advance (which probably left many men "winded") and usually after being disordered by the first volley from the enemy. It is worth noting that at Germantown, where the boot was on the other foot, the Americans suffered more heavily in the exchanges of musketry. Sounds plausible and could very well be the case,but is still theoritical.Some might argue they often attacked to avoid being picked off by rifle armed americans where the british were generaly able to turn the tables.Some of the material I've read implied if not stated that the british did not like to engage in fire fights,but wished to bring matters to the bayonet as quickly as possible where they were generally superior.Of course there are exceptions,but often this was the result. 2) Until the very end of the war, only the Americans used "buck and ball" which resulted in a higher number of hits than a single ball. The British Regulars only used it in the South. I just read this and found that to be very interesting.I had no idea this was done,just shows you how much I need to learn. :) 3) British volleys at Lexington/Concord and Bunker Hill most certainly were noted as too high by several observers. However, these were "green" troops (especially compared to the numbers of F&I vets among the enemy). The same happened at Freeman's Farm, for much the same reasons. Also, both at Bunker Hill and Freeman's Farm, the British were firing up or down gradients, which invariably spoils aim. Not to mention firing on troops behind cover is going to be problem.When firing at troops behind walls or hard cover I think you cannot judge a units accuracy fairly.Take that and what you just mentioned and one cannot get a fair assesment for these engagements,excluding Freemans farm where your explantion is the only. On a general level, all troops were taught to aim at the knees at close range (under 50-60 yards) to allow for the upward "kick" of the musket. Shooting low was not a peculiarly American tactic; nor - despite popular mythology - was "aiming" per se, albeit the Americans did have a specific command for this whilst the British didn't I don't doubt that,but the implication seems to be that the americans trained more intensely on aim then the british,but if that's true or not is the question.I suppose perspective plays it part. Longrifles did in fact have "aiming sites" which would encourage more practice in aiming.It's one of the reasons they couldn't fit the rifles with bayonets. Incidentally, there are many instances of poor marksmanship by Americans - even riflemen. Two examples are Webster crossing the mill pond at Weitzel's Mills, with 25 riflemen firing at him from the safety of a log cabin; and 200(ish) rifle-armed militia, firing from behind a fence, caused no more than a dozen casualties with a short-range volley at three companies of the Queen's Rangers being led by Ewald at Spencer's Ordinary. Of course there are examples,but generally speaking riflemen were good shots and that's fairly well documented.I will say this,the author also said even experienced riflemen had difficulities in shooting downhill and that riflemen in a valley had an advantage over those on a hill.I think that helps explain King's Mountain to some degree. Looking forward to your view.

The only comment I would make on your replies is that bayonets and artillery actually caused very few casualties during the AWI, except where one side was in prepared positions. In open battle, roundshot casualties were very rare, whilst canister damage would have been pretty "even stevens". Bayonet melees were very few and far between in open battle - not least because they are easily avoided; in fact, I can only think of the Marylanders and Foot Guards at GCH that doesn't involve the storming of defensive works. You are quite correct that the British deliberately "advanced to contact" in order to keep losses from enemy fire to a minimum, especially in the case of riflemen, whose weapons were slower to load. If you haven't read it yet, get hold of Matthew Spring's "With Zeal and with Bayonets only" which provides a lot of detail on this. The point about uphill and downhill firing is also well made, although the British were moving uphill at Cowpens and GCH, so should have had the advantage on those specific occasions. Over on the Yahoo! Revlist, one of the regular contributors is a former Special Forces sniper; he carried out some experiments with a rifle (contemporary) and musket on targets at different elevations and found a considerable (by his standards!) deviation in hitting the parts of the target he aimed at. As a further thought, the fact that the Americans usually fought behind cover would also limit casualties from return fire. I wonder if perhaps the traditional image/reputation of the devstating British volley - Quebec, Minden, the Napoleonic Wars - has led to a false expectation where the circumstances were not the same (ie defensive as opposed to offensive). Not necessarily apples v. oranges, but possibly cooking apples v. eating apples?

The only comment I would make on your replies is that bayonets and artillery actually caused very few casualties during the AWI, except where one side was in prepared positions. In open battle, roundshot casualties were very rare, whilst canister damage would have been pretty "even stevens". Bayonet melees were very few and far between in open battle - not least because they are easily avoided; in fact, I can only think of the Marylanders and Foot Guards at GCH that doesn't involve the storming of defensive works. This sounds very much in line with the American Civil War where I have a much better education.(although not an expert by any stretch)While I think there was more hand to hand combat in the ACW,there was less then what many believe.It's very hard to both stand up to bayonets and to actually deliver them.Basically,troops did not like to engage in bayonet combat and would always prefer the musketry to decide.Often one side broke and ran before actual close combat began.So,your explantion is all the more plausible I think. :wink: You are quite correct that the British deliberately "advanced to contact" in order to keep losses from enemy fire to a minimum, especially in the case of riflemen, whose weapons were slower to load. If you haven't read it yet, get hold of Matthew Spring's "With Zeal and with Bayonets only" which provides a lot of detail on this. No,sadly my reading on this period is something to be woefully desired and I thank you for the tip. :) The point about uphill and downhill firing is also well made, although the British were moving uphill at Cowpens and GCH, so should have had the advantage on those specific occasions. Over on the Yahoo! Revlist, one of the regular contributors is a former Special Forces sniper; he carried out some experiments with a rifle (contemporary) and musket on targets at different elevations and found a considerable (by his standards!) deviation in hitting the parts of the target he aimed at. That's a good point on CP and GCH,all I can say is alot of firing was at angles and not completely straight up and down and this could account for some of the casualities caused.But,this is merely theoritcal without much study.Just a weak guess on my part. :? As a further thought, the fact that the Americans usually fought behind cover would also limit casualties from return fire. Yep,one of the points I was trying to express. :wink: I wonder if perhaps the traditional image/reputation of the devstating British volley - Quebec, Minden, the Napoleonic Wars - has led to a false expectation where the circumstances were not the same (ie defensive as opposed to offensive). Not necessarily apples v. oranges, but possibly cooking apples v. eating apples? A very good question,and one where I require more education to address properly,but I will say the british were noted for their rate of fire as well and I think this is also a factor in their reputation. :wink: Always more than happy to offer an opinion - but equally happy to hear everyone else's, as most of my understanding of the period comes from doing that. 8) I'm happy to hear that and appreciate it as your input helps to increase my understanding.I'm looking forward to more conversions as my knowledge increases and I can delve futher on subjects.I have alot of catching up to do,thanks for the help. :D

Allow me to add the Paoli Massacre and the Baylor Massacre to the list. British Major General Charles Grey seems to have built his career on bayonet charges ... to the extent that he earned the nickname "No-Flint Grey." I suspect the British use of bayonets was a wee bit more common than you're allowing. Hmm,interesting and of course I wasn't aware of this other then it was "suggested" and "implied" the british used the bayonet often in the war to decide matters.I will say these were more raids then actual battlefield action,but I'm not sure how important that distinction is. I'm enjoying this,both you and Ronan are better educated then myself and I'm benefiting from both of your perspectives.I'm looking forward to hThis is a bit of a nitpick, but I believe "often" would be a more suitable word here than "usually." The Continental Army fought many general engagements where the european military tactic of maneuvering and firing in ranks was employed -- Brandywine, Monmouth, and Germantown to name but a few.is reply. I agree often is a better turn of word,but the examples of the battles you gave would reflect more favourably on the british as they either out and out won those engagements or performed superior to the americans. :wink:

I was just addressing the issue of firing from cover. Oh yes,that's well understood,I was merely remarking what will be an obvious point of reference from someone having a different point of view will likely comment. :) As for myself,I need to read some more before I can give my opinion if americans were in fact more accurate with their fire.I'm inclined to think yes,but not convinced that they were.I've heard some compelling arguements that cannot be dismissed out of hand. :wink: At Brandywine, Washington received poor intelligence regarding the existance of Cornwallis's column ... however, at the same time he would have to accept blame for not deploying better reconnaissance. Given the surprise on their right, the Continental Army performed fairly well, ultimately retreating in good order. Even some British officers had favorable remarks about how some Continental regiments (Marylanders, iirc) acquitted themselves. I apologize,I've only read the basics of this engagement and I only have the broad perspective of events that indicted the british success.I will try and read futher into this battle and keep in mind your opinion that has come about through a better study. :) A successful Continental assault at Germantown fell apart because a drunken Continental commander directed his brigade to attacked the rear of another Continental brigade. Many of the battle's Continental casualties were victims of 'friendly fire.' I should also acknowledge that a stand at Cliveden made by Colonel Thomas Musgrave and six companies of the 40th Regiment was a significant drain on Continental time and resources at a crucial moment of the battle. The American siege of Cliveden was essentially an attack on a fortified position and caused disproportionate casualties for the Continentals. Again,I must ask for patience and plead the same situation as the previous engagement.I find this reference to a drunken Continental commander as very interesting,and you have perked my ears up and lit a fire of curosity.I need to read this,could you give me a reference please. :) The Battle of Monmouth is almost universally recognized as the moment where the Continental Army demonstrated it had become fully professional. The result was a draw where again the Continentals were commended by their British counterparts This engagement I have been doing some study other then just an over view.While it may be true that the result was a draw,it must be noted that the british won or at least were not defeated in every engagement in this battle.It must also be expressed that the british did not press the battle to a conclusion. My reference is the Osprey campaign book Monmouth Courthouse 1778 by Brendan Morrissey if that is of any importance.Some appear to disagree with his view of Lee(myself included)as misaligned,and I'm not sure if this also colored his perception of the battle itself as I have not done any great study of the battle to make a reasonable comparison. :wink:

For accounts of both Brandywine and Germantown, I highly recommend Thomas McGuire's The Philadelphia Campaign: vol. 1, Brandywine and the fall of Philadelphia; vol. 2, Germantown and the roads to Valley Forge. The stories are skillfully told using the participants own words. I've provided a link to find the work at your local library, but really these volumes are worth owning. My apprehension of Monmouth isn't as strong as for the other two battles, but from my recollection I believe the Continentals ended the day in possession of the battlefield, which in the 18th Century was the principal determinant of victory. However, that is somewhat complicated by the fact that the British were traveling from Philadelphia to New York, so it could be argued that continuing on to NY didn't compromise their victory. Ultimately, I think a draw is the right judgment.

For accounts of both Brandywine and Germantown, I highly recommend Thomas McGuire's The Philadelphia Campaign: vol. 1, Brandywine and the fall of Philadelphia; vol. 2, Germantown and the roads to Valley Forge. The stories are skillfully told using the participants own words. I've provided a link to find the work at your local library, but really these volumes are worth owning. Great,thank you! :) I'll be sure to add them to my amazon wish list.I'll get back to you hopefully at a later date on these books. :) My apprehension of Monmouth isn't as strong as for the other two battles, but from my recollection I believe the Continentals ended the day in possession of the battlefield, which in the 18th Century was the principal determinant of victory. However, that is somewhat complicated by the fact that the British were traveling from Philadelphia to New York, so it could be argued that continuing on to NY didn't compromise their victory. Ultimately, I think a draw is the right judgment. I agree with history's assessment that the result was an overall draw.My only point was that in each engagement through the course of the battle the british more or less came out on top. Although in defense of the americans they were outnumbered and inflicted higher casualities in the battle overall,in addition like you mentioned they did control the battlefield at the end of the day. :wink: