Grey was not unusual in his methods; it was very much the norm in surprise attacks and particularly night actions, as there was (a) no chance of an accidental discharge warning the enemy; and (b) the attack would not be stalled by people stopping to reload, which was the automatic progression from having just fired. Such a tactic was common in Europe, and there were never any cries of "foul" or complaints about "brutality" or "war crimes" - I'm afraid this was very much a case of a naive civilian populace suddenly being exposed to the realities of war (not to mention the inevitable seizure by the Whigs of any opportunity to indulge in propaganda for the benefit of their supporters back in Britain). Good point about the numbers of prisoners taken. In fact, all of the traditional "massacres" of the war - Paoli, Tappan, Waxhaws - were nothing like what they were painted as at the time and involved the taking of many prisoners (mostly unwounded) and the proper treatment of wounded prisoners after the action by Grey, Tarleton and others. The impression of inherently superior American marksmanship was certainly one the British shared at the start of the war - reinforced by a story that appeared in an English newspaper (but which has never been substantiated) that 20 officers were killed at Bunker Hill by a single marksman, with his colleagues loading for him. As a result, British units arriving in 1776 (such as the Guards) were advised to remove all officer lace and other appointments. However, the Hessians flatly refused to do this and suffered no worse; eventually, even the British stopped bothering and "rediscovered" epaulettes, lace, sashes and gorgets. In fact, outside of the Saratoga campaign and the action at Cowpens, the proportion of British casualties who were officers was actually slightly lower than the ratio of officers to men generally, for the rest of the war post-Bunker Hill. It's worth noting that Morgan was present at Saratoga and Cowpens and I firmly believe that his personal leadership (and those of his ilk, such as Thompson and Hands in the 1775-1776 period) was instrumental in the successful deployment of riflemen in those actions. Other than the few rifle-armed frontiersmen in the Continentals and certain militia units, hardly any of the Continental rank-and-file would have used firearms before joining (certainly post-1777, when recruits increasingly came from the landless, labouring classes). Muskets would have been very expensive to purchase and maintain, and such men would seldom have been part of the pre-war militia set-up because of their itinerant lifestyle. There was nothing special in the amount of training done by the Continentals, compared to the Regulars, so the generality of the rank-and-file had no obvious reason for any superiority in marksmanship. Riflemen - at least those who were genuinely hunters, many early recruits were frauds and led to Washington reducing the number of rifles in the Main Army as the war progressed - would largely have been self-taught (again due to lifestyle).

Bayonet Assaults, Riflemen, et al...
It should be remembered that the Continental Corps of Light Infantry, a provisional unit, did very well, and excelled, at bayonet assaults at night. The two they are famous for are Stony Point in 1779 and against Redoubt Number 10 at Yorktown in 1781. It wasn't just a British specialty. Washington never wanted more than 1,000 riflemen with the army at any one time. Riflemen unsupported by regular infantry armed with muskets and bayonets could get into trouble very quickly. Morgan was supported by Dearborn's light infnatry, for example, at Freeman's Farm in 1777. Greene had two rifle units with him at Guilford Courthouse. Both were integrated with regular ligth infantry units and cavalry during the action. One interesting facet of von Steuben's Blue Book was that the firing commands differed somewhat from that of the British Army. While the British command was 'Present,' von Steuben used 'Take Aim.' Small, but perhaps significant. Sincerely, G

Ronan the Librarian wrote: Grey was not unusual in his methods; it was very much the norm in surprise attacks and particularly night actions, as there was (a) no chance of an accidental discharge warning the enemy; and (b) the attack would not be stalled by people stopping to reload, which was the automatic progression from having just fired. Such a tactic was common in Europe, and there were never any cries of "foul" or complaints about "brutality" or "war crimes" - I'm afraid this was very much a case of a naive civilian populace suddenly being exposed to the realities of war (not to mention the inevitable seizure by the Whigs of any opportunity to indulge in propaganda for the benefit of their supporters back in Britain). Propaganda goes both ways so I don't put too much in that.I agree on your explanation on Grey and other commanding officiers in this period goes along with what I've read and the opinion I have reached so far on this subject.Although I have yet to read in full length accounts on Grey other then Wikapedia.As usual,I need to read more. :roll: Good point about the numbers of prisoners taken. In fact, all of the traditional "massacres" of the war - Paoli, Tappan, Waxhaws - were nothing like what they were painted as at the time and involved the taking of many prisoners (mostly unwounded) and the proper treatment of wounded prisoners after the action by Grey, Tarleton and others At least for Grey from what I've read so far,and this comes mainly from military perspective and prisoners taken,but Tarleton I need to do a bit more reading before I offer an opinion,all I know is his reputation was shall we say less then complementary.I'm curious as too what I'll discover. :) The impression of inherently superior American marksmanship was certainly one the British shared at the start of the war - reinforced by a story that appeared in an English newspaper (but which has never been substantiated) that 20 officers were killed at Bunker Hill by a single marksman, with his colleagues loading for him. As a result, British units arriving in 1776 (such as the Guards) were advised to remove all officer lace and other appointments. However, the Hessians flatly refused to do this and suffered no worse; eventually, even the British stopped bothering and "rediscovered" epaulettes, lace, sashes and gorgets. In fact, outside of the Saratoga campaign and the action at Cowpens, the proportion of British casualties who were officers was actually slightly lower than the ratio of officers to men generally, for the rest of the war post-Bunker Hill. It's worth noting that Morgan was present at Saratoga and Cowpens and I firmly believe that his personal leadership (and those of his ilk, such as Thompson and Hands in the 1775-1776 period) was instrumental in the successful deployment of riflemen in those actions. Again,I wish to do some more study on american marksmenship and read other perspectives,but I find your view plausible and compelling and probably accurate,but the question is why.I know at cowpens(I'm reading it now)that Morgan encouraged "sniping"on the officier ranks and perhaps this wasn't so pressed in the other engagements.I don't know,but it's something I seek to evaluate. As for Morgan,he is emerging as my favorite american commander of this period.So far,from what I've been reading he is impressing me a great deal.He reminds me in some ways of Nathan Bedford Forrest in that his lack of status in the gentry,somewhat covers up his genius for command.(without a doubt the case with Bedford)I wonder how things would have went for cornwallis at GCH if morgan was present with Greene.It's food for thought I think. :wink: Other than the few rifle-armed frontiersmen in the Continentals and certain militia units, hardly any of the Continental rank-and-file would have used firearms before joining (certainly post-1777, when recruits increasingly came from the landless, labouring classes). Muskets would have been very expensive to purchase and maintain, and such men would seldom have been part of the pre-war militia set-up because of their itinerant lifestyle. There was nothing special in the amount of training done by the Continentals, compared to the Regulars, so the generality of the rank-and-file had no obvious reason for any superiority in marksmanship. Riflemen - at least those who were genuinely hunters, many early recruits were frauds and led to Washington reducing the number of rifles in the Main Army as the war progressed - would largely have been self-taught (again due to lifestyle). I'm just not educated enough to comment on this other then to say I need to read more.You present a decent arguement and until I've studied a bit more I'll accept your point of view as better informed then myself. :wink: Again,thank you for the feedback and taking the time to have a discussion. :)

Gassendi wrote: It should be remembered that the Continental Corps of Light Infantry, a provisional unit, did very well, and excelled, at bayonet assaults at night. The two they are famous for are Stony Point in 1779 and against Redoubt Number 10 at Yorktown in 1781. It wasn't just a British specialty. Hello,nice to hear fresh perspectives. :) No reason to think that there were not any well trained Continental regiments,rather this was the norm with the british regiments as a very integral part of their training from what I understand.I could be wrong of course. Washington never wanted more than 1,000 riflemen with the army at any one time. Riflemen unsupported by regular infantry armed with muskets and bayonets could get into trouble very quickly. Morgan was supported by Dearborn's light infnatry, for example, at Freeman's Farm in 1777. Greene had two rifle units with him at Guilford Courthouse. Both were integrated with regular ligth infantry units and cavalry during the action. Yep,I'll go with that.Morgan did the same at Cowpens. :wink: One interesting facet of von Steuben's Blue Book was that the firing commands differed somewhat from that of the British Army. While the British command was 'Present,' von Steuben used 'Take Aim.' Small, but perhaps significant. Your right it could very well be,as a matter of fact our very own Ronin pointed out the inclusion of "Take Aim" in american drill as a possible indication of americans aiming and not just pointing. :)

Continentals
By 1779 the Continental regular was the equal of the British and assorted Germans that they faced in the field. Unfortunately, there were not enough of them and Washington never got the size of the army he wanted. I just finished my master's thesis on that subject. I don't recall any official brigading of riflemen and Continentals at Cowpens, especially not how they were at Guilford. Sincerely, Kevin

By 1779 the Continental regular was the equal of the British and assorted Germans that they faced in the field. Unfortunately, there were not enough of them and Washington never got the size of the army he wanted. I just finished my master's thesis on that subject. Yes,That was evident in several regiments,like 1st Maryland at GCH.Of course that's Greene in command there,but I'm sure it's the same with Washington.That's one perspective and one I agree with,although bear in mind I'm still catching up on my reading for this period. :wink: I don't recall any official brigading of riflemen and Continentals at Cowpens, especially not how they were at Guilford. I'm in the process of reading "A Devil of a Whipping"The battle of the Cowpens by Lawrence E. Babits and my conclusion came more from Morgan's tactics then a written battle order.I've completed the preface and 20+pages(other time issues at the moment :roll: )and if you have the book I'll refer you to p.18 where it states in Pennsylvania"Morgan countered these tactics by supporting miltia riflemen with Continentals and opting to attack British officers and noncommissioned officiers as targets"I see no reason why Morgan would abandon these tactics at Cowpens where he was engaging light infantry and cavalry that these tactics were in essence designed for.Please remember,I'm not finished with the book and I wouldn't be surprised if an order of battle presents itself.Personally I think it's a logical conclusion that this was SOP(standard operating procedures) for Morgan by this time.I cannot say with an absolute certainity,but this is my conviction. :)

Continentals and Riflemen
The by-now standard tactic of supporting riflemen with Continentals was understood by most commanders by 1781. However, at Cowpens the available riflemen were not brigaded in a unit with Continentals as they were at Gulford Courthouse. At Guilford, Washington's dragoons were brigaded with Kirkwood's Delaware light infantry company and Lynch's riflemen and these fought on the American right flank with the first two militia lines. Lee and his Legion, with the attached riflemen under Campbell, were given the same mission on the American left flank. There was no such organization at Cowpens. Sincerely, G