Continental Army

Continental Army
I have found that I still have a copy of the Blandford Colour Series, Uniforms of the American Revolution. I have been going through it and I have become a little confused. Were regiments like The Delaware Regiment or the 1st Maryland Regiment, Continental Army Regiments or State Regiments and did it make any difference? The clearly were more than Militia. If they were Continental Army did they have a Regimental Number? In the Scenarios 1 book there is reference to 4th/5th Pa in Humpton's Brigade at Brandywine. I assume this meant that 2 under strength regiments were put together to make 1 regiment capable of taking its place in the line but were they continentals or were they state, and again does it make any difference?

Hrmm .. this is sort of a complex issue with many facets. To start off, numerical regimental designations were usually used only when more than one regiment of that sort existed. Thus, the Delaware Regiment didn't need a number because it was the only regiment from Delaware. To further confuse, some regiments were known by both a numerical designation and by the name of its commander. Thus, the 4th Continental Artillery Regiment was also known as Proctor's Artillery Regiment. Occasionally, a regiment retained a former commander's name after he'd been killed; for instance the Delaware Regiment was also known as Haslet's Regiment and continued to be called that well after John Haslet had been killed at Princeton in 1777. Operationally, the distinction between state and Continental regiments was important. Continental regiments were part of the Continental Army establishment had to comply with the orders of Continental officers. State regiments were less constrained by a responsibility to national authorities. Most were directed by their respective states to cooperate fully with the Continental Army, often subordinating their own command to Continental command. However, there are notable exceptions, like the New Hampshire militia under John Stark who refused to support Schuyler at Saratoga.forumer.com/viewtopic.php?p=23204#23204><1><2> When a regiment passed into Continental service, this transfer was recorded in government and military records. For instance, we know that on June 6, 1777, the Pennsylvania State Regiment was offered by Pennsylvania authorities to Congress for incorporation into the Continental Army. On June 10th, the Continental Congress accepted the offer and the regiment was transfered. Within a few weeks, the regiment had unofficially taken on the name "13th Pennsylvania Regiment." And on November 12th, the numerical designation became official. Interestingly, there seems to be a species of military unit that is often overlooked by historians and not really acknowledged in the BG! rules. The Pennsylvania State Regiment (prior to its incorporation into the Continental Army establishment) seems to have occupied a space between militia and Continental Line regiment. It appears to have been like a Continental regiment in strength and its condition of permanent activation, yet still a state controlled unit with restrictions on where it could operate (i.e. inside the state of Pennsylvania) and some consequential freedom from national authority. The PSR was a fully-formed professional regiment of national calibre, but for Pennsylvania exclusively. I don't know much about the Green Mountain Boys, but perhaps they were similar? Surely there were other state units that occupied a similar position. Er, sorry. Perhaps this explanation is more nuanced than you need.

Thanks for you reply Cornet and my apologies for not coming back to you. From what you are saying ( and from the little I have read) it seems that the differentiation between State Line and Continental line impacted mainly in the area of command & control and was heavily influenced by the personal animosities or affections of the senior officers involved. (Could be an interesting aspect in a campaign.) The quality of both seems to have varied considerably Looking at the "Orbats" for Brandywine in the Scenarios 1 book, I assume that where it says for example 4th/5th Pa this would have been 2 State regiments combined not the 4th & 5th Continental Regiments, especially as there is a 1st/5th Va. I have just started reading McGuire's book on the Philadelphia Campaign, which I hope will throw some light on the subject but in the meantime I would be interested to hear from those who have been studying the period for longer than I have.

From 1777 onwards, coinciding with the new 3-year enlistments, Continental regiments were numbered by State. Therefore I think the 4th/5th PA would be Continentals, not State troops - very few States (if any) could have afforded to support that many units of regular troops on their own payroll. State regiments would have included invalid and older former Continentals, so should not be dismissed in terms of combat performance. I seem to recall the GMB were considered one of the Additional Regiments. Robert K Wright's book on the Continental Army is very good and is available on line.

A tip for Cornet: Type it into a word document off-line then copy-and-paste into the reply box... my internet connection is playing up so at the moment I'm using this technique on anything longer tha

That's probably easier than beating the stuffing out of the service provider, yet somehow much less satisfying.

Try both methods!

True! I had constructed a false dichotomy!

Continental Army, state units, militia...
To get back to the original question, if I may, yes it did make a difference, especially after the winter of 1777-1778, who belonged to whom and what units were available. Both the militia and state units drew off needed manpower resources from the Continental units and hampered Washington's attempts to have 'an army for the war.' The militia was a 'broken reed.' They would sometimes turn on the Americans and support the British, depending on who had the upper hand in the area. When called to active service, they would show up without the necessary arms and equipment, draw on Continental stores and leave when they felt like it. The Continenals' nickname for the militia 'long faces' was appropriate. The enlistments and terms of service, as well as enlistment bounties, were much better for state and militia units and it should be remembered that it was the Continentals who won the war, not the militia or state regulars. Of course, without the French the US could not have won either. Sincerely, G

The enlistments and terms of service, as well as enlistment bounties, were much better for state and militia units and it should be remembered that it was the Continentals who won the war, not the militia or state regulars. Of course, without the French the US could not have won either. The Continentals needed the militia,and even more so in the South.They both needed each other,although of course the Continentals performed better.I think it would be fair to say they shouldered more of the burden and were responsible for more successes,but they needed the milita in the end to wear down and outnumber the british. As far as the French goes,your probably correct,but it's hard to judge a peoples resolve and therefore that statement cannot be said with a absolute certainty. :wink:

Broken Staffs...
The militia were only needed because of the circumstances that I briefly outlined. A large well-trained Continental Army could have defeated the British much earlier and the existence of the militia hampered enlistments and much else. In the War of 1812 they were worse. That's why that was the last war in which militia played a significant role. The viewpoint you espouse here is that championed by such historians as John Shy and Don Higginbotham (the last I had as a history professor in college-I wasn't impressed). That viewpoint came to the forefront in the aftermath of Vietnam when people were under the belief that the Viet Cong won in the south which wasn't the case at all, as the VC, both politically and militarily were destroyed in TET 68. Yet, that belief, and the old myths and legends of who beneficial the militia was during the Revolution, still is found today even in graduate-level military history courses. It is just that-myth and legend. Sincerely, G

A large well-trained Continental Army could have defeated the British much earlier and the existence of the militia hampered enlistments and much else. I agree,but that wasn't the case and therefore militia were required.I'm missing your point I think.I thought we were discussing what actually happened and not conjecture. :? The viewpoint you espouse here is that championed by such historians as John Shy and Don Higginbotham (the last I had as a history professor in college-I wasn't impressed). I've never heard of them,but as I've pointed out I'm pretty new to a deeper study of this period.I'm trying to catch up so I can give all of you a better conversation. :) That viewpoint came to the forefront in the aftermath of Vietnam when people were under the belief that the Viet Cong won in the south which wasn't the case at all, as the VC, both politically and militarily were destroyed in TET 68. Yet, In regards to this I agree 100%. :wink: Yet, that belief, and the old myths and legends of who beneficial the militia was during the Revolution, still is found today even in graduate-level military history courses. It is just that-myth and legend. I'm not sure I agree here,but sadly due to my lack of knowledge I cannot give you a decent reply just yet.I'm working on it. :)

To get back to the original question, if I may, yes it did make a difference, especially after the winter of 1777-1778, who belonged to whom and what units were available. Both the militia and state units drew off needed manpower resources from the Continental units and hampered Washington's attempts to have 'an army for the war.' The militia was a 'broken reed.' They would sometimes turn on the Americans and support the British, depending on who had the upper hand in the area. When called to active service, they would show up without the necessary arms and equipment, draw on Continental stores and leave when they felt like it. The Continenals' nickname for the militia 'long faces' was appropriate. The enlistments and terms of service, as well as enlistment bounties, were much better for state and militia units and it should be remembered that it was the Continentals who won the war, not the militia or state regulars. Of course, without the French the US could not have won either. I can't speak to the pay scales of all state service, but Pennsylvania had a great deal of difficulty with recruiting for its militias and state navy. The Continental pay scale was usually better, not only attracting new recruits to Continental service in lieu of state service but also syphoning away men already in state service. In fact, the lure of Continental service, coupled with the ongoing problem of desertions, almost wrecked the Pennsylvania State Navy, a key component in preventing the Royal Navy from supplying the British Army in Philadelphia. Eventually, Washington had to loan the PSN men to restore its warships to fighting strength. Insofar as the quality of militia units themselves, it is undoubtedly true that the quality of a common militia unit was markedly below that of a Continental unit. However, numerous deviations from this norm indicate a logical fallacy -- the overwhelming exception. The Massachusetts minutemen, the Philadelphia Light Horse, Green Mountain Boys, New York Provincial Company of Artillery, Kentucky militia under George Rogers Clark, and others serve to complicate and enhance the reputation of American militia during the Revolution. The category of militia does not represent a homogeneous entity that could be assigned a static, one-size-fits-all value. With regard to state regulars, I believe this again is a more complex situation than you have acknowledged. Many state-authorized regiments were later absorbed into Continental service. The experience of the Pennsylvania State Regiment was not unique; as stated above, it was created by the state for home defense then later transfered into Continental service. Was PSR's unit readiness unacceptable prior to transfer? Apparently not. Pennsylvania also authorized Proctor's Artillery Company at Fort Mifflin, which later grew into Proctor's Artillery Regiment, which still later was transfered to Continental service and redesignated the 4th Continental Artillery Regiment. Various cavalry and infantry regiments in state service followed an evolutionary path similar to Proctor's Artillery Company. The difference between these state units (prior to transfer) and their Continental Army counterparts was not combat readiness or combat effectiveness, but merely the level of integration into a unified national command. Furthermore, despite the improving professional soldiery of the Continental Army, one could easily write a hundred pages on deficiencies of specific Continental regiments. They didn't all perform at the level of the Delaware Regiment and Morgan's Rifles. Thus, to say that Continentals, not militia or state regulars, won the war oversimplifies the situation. Washington, having originally been a militia commander himself, knew the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the militia system. Washington learned to use state militias skillfully as an adjunct to his regulars. I will also have to agree with Axebreaker regarding the French. They facilitated and even expedited victory, but one cannot state with any certainty that their assistance was necessary for it. Fwiw, I have read Don Higgenbotham's The War of American Independence and found it illuminating. It was perhaps a little dry, but useful none-the-less. I later spoke with him briefly, which was something less than illuminating; in fact, his demeanor was approaching unpleasant and persuaded me not to apply to UNC's graduate program.

A large well-trained Continental Army could have defeated the British much earlier and the existence of the militia hampered enlistments and much else. The assumption that militiamen would have opted for Continental service if militia service were not available is unsupported. In fact, many men selected militia service because they could not afford a long enlistments, mistrusted officers in Continental service, or simply did not want to serve outside their home state. In the War of 1812 they were worse. That's why that was the last war in which militia played a significant role. Well, except for the hundreds (thousands?) of militia regiments that served during the American Civil War .... and the militia units that we now call the National Guard. Among those, the 28th Division (United States) has a rather extensive and important combat history.

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