French Support
Without the French, the US would not have won, They gave material support before the Alliance in 1778 and the issue musket of the Continental Army, for example, became the French Charleville by 1779. French volunteers, such as Fleury and Gimat, served in the Continental Army and contributed to its growing professionalism. And French and Spanish intervention divided the British war effort. However, the French didn't win he war, but their contribution was immense. The Alliance in actuality won the war. And the French defeated the British in their own areas of interest. Sincerely, G

I don't have much to add other then by and large I agree with Gassendi.

I posted to before I saw Gassendi last reply.With this last statement I'll reply the same way I did on a similar subject in that the US probably would not have won without the French,but it is not an absolute certainity.Revolutions,uprising,insurgency's and conflicts of this nature are harder then standard wars to predict.The political aspect of these conflicts weigh at least as high as the military.If the will of the people is against the established rulers then their task is extremely difficult and often just wears down the ruling power. Therefore,in my opinion without the French you could say it is a pretty much a done deal it wouldn't have ended nearly so quick,but to say Americans would never have achieved independence is another matter and is open to debate that really cannot be fully resolved. :wink:

Sorry Gassendi, but I have to disagree with you on the Suffren post... twelve of the line is a squadron not a fleet. Suffren's attack on Johnstone whilst in neutral Cap Verde is audacious. But Suffren's actions against Hughes were indecisive - other than managing to get to Trincomalee two days before Hughes arrived and therefore capturing it. Hughes stuck to the Fighting Instructions too rigidly and Suffren was repeatedly poorly supported by his subordinates, somewhat 'hamstringing' his tactical skill. Because of this their actual engagements were hardly ringing victories for either side. However, it is interesting to note that not only did Sufferen's squadron (then only five of the line - 2x74 and 3x64) leave France on the same day as De Grasse's fleet, but that Suffren was attempting to break Hughes' line on the same day that Rodney was doing it to De Grasse on the other side of the world at The Saintes. But, I would join with you in also recommending this campaign as the engagements do offer three modestly sized interesting scenarios to wargame! :wink: GJ

I have been following the debate with some interest, for what it is worth I would like to put in my "two pennyworth". I only started becoming interested in AWI at the beginning of the year so my knowledge is limited. I have read Urban's "Fusiliers" (which got me into the period), Bicheno's "Rebels and Redcoats" ( he seems to have an axe to grind) Vol. 1 of McGuire's "Philadelphia Campaign" ( seemed very good to me) and I am currently reading Hibbert's "Redcoats & Rebels" (seems more balanced than Bicheno). It doesn't seem fair to say that "the Americans did not win the British just quit". The British War aim was to re-establish Royal Authority and at the end they did not succeed in the 13 Colonies. On the other hand it seems that a major strategic aim of the Rebels, and subsequently the USA was to remove all British presence for the North American continent and in that the US also failed as Canada is not part of the USA. It is a measure of Washington's achievement that there was a professional US army to hold the field when the British left. He was also fortunate in that there was no second more radical revolution" where his reputation was destroyed (e.g. Kerensy and the Girondins) At the end of the day there seem to have been several contributing factors to the loss of the 13 Colonies independent of the Americans. 1. The political divisions at home meant that for a significant section of the British political class a defeat in America was a desirable outcome, at least until the French became involved. (In the Duchess of Devonshire we even had our own 18th C version of "Hanoi Jane") 2. The personal animosities of the senior commanders prevented any strategic consensus about how to conduct the war. 3. The administration in London neither let the commanders on the ground "get on with it", nor did they ensure that if they were going to constrain them with detailed orders then those orders were sufficiently clear to all the senior commanders to ensure the right level of co-ordination. 4. The British believed their own propaganda regarding the size of active loyalist support as opposed to loyalist sentiment. 5. Finally I think the British consistently underestimated the American ruthlessness in dealing with Loyalists and their army's ability to learn from its experiences. For what it is worth that how it seems to me but I would be interested to know if I have got hold of the wrong end of the stick or not. :?