With zeal, bayonets and British Grenadier

With zeal, bayonets and British Grenadier
I have just finished this excellent and eminently readable, and therefore enjoyable, tome. Although familiar with the gist of the book from posts on this and other forums, principally the formations and flexibility of the British, two strands emerged that have started me thinking about the BG rules. Not surprising really as I am a wargamer not a historian. Firstly the book dispels the myth around how effective rebel musketry was but, interestingly, seems to conclude that British musketry was no worse than the rebels. So why do the British get a +1 in firing? I can’t actually believe I am writing this! All my instincts from what I have read, and the few Napoleonic games I have played, led me to accept this without a moments hesitation. Secondly, the bayonet charge. Those of you who have read some of my AAR’s now how reluctant I am to launch a bayonet charge when I can usually disperse the rebels with some nice volleys. Too many things can go badly wrong with a charge whereas if you get a poor volley off it’s not too bad. Now from reading the book I really should be launching charges at the earliest opportunity as the British noticed most rebel troops were very reluctant to stand and usually broke first. Now, to get them to break its best to put a few volleys in to accumulate DP and therefore disorder them. However, “in most battlefield encounters it was un-necessary for the King’s troops to soften up the enemy before attempting to break them with the bayonet” Also the British don’t appear to have closed up before launching a charge but it is recognised that they would have come off worse against a more compact enemy who stood. It seems to me that we need to encourage more British bayonet charges, even in open order, and increase the likelihood of the rebels not standing. That the British were willing to charge in open order speaks of their confidence in the rebels not standing. So what to do, if anything? It’s probably bad form to be influenced just by one book but here goes: Morale British infantry testing to charge +1 American 2nd Line or militia responding to an infantry charge -1 (or 2?) American Line troops already represent the best and steadiest Continentals and as the war progressed more American troops became steadier and, in game terms, you get a higher proportion of Line which ties in nicely with the British bayonet charge being less effective toward the end of the conflict. Right, well that’s me standing well above the parapet and awaiting the wrath of the more learned worthies :( Regards Paul

Re: With zeal, bayonets and British Grenadier
Firstly the book dispels the myth around how effective rebel musketry was but, interestingly, seems to conclude that British musketry was no worse than the rebels. So why do the British get a +1 in firing? I can’t actually believe I am writing this! All my instincts from what I have read, and the few Napoleonic games I have played, led me to accept this without a moments hesitation. Secondly, the bayonet charge. Those of you who have read some of my AAR’s now how reluctant I am to launch a bayonet charge when I can usually disperse the rebels with some nice volleys. Too many things can go badly wrong with a charge whereas if you get a poor volley off it’s not too bad. Now from reading the book I really should be launching charges at the earliest opportunity as the British noticed most rebel troops were very reluctant to stand and usually broke first. Now, to get them to break its best to put a few volleys in to accumulate DP and therefore disorder them. However, “in most battlefield encounters it was un-necessary for the King’s troops to soften up the enemy before attempting to break them with the bayonet” Also the British don’t appear to have closed up before launching a charge but it is recognised that they would have come off worse against a more compact enemy who stood. It seems to me that we need to encourage more British bayonet charges, even in open order, and increase the likelihood of the rebels not standing. That the British were willing to charge in open order speaks of their confidence in the rebels not standing. So what to do, if anything? It’s probably bad form to be influenced just by one book but here goes: Morale British infantry testing to charge +1 American 2nd Line or militia responding to an infantry charge -1 (or 2?) American Line troops already represent the best and steadiest Continentals and as the war progressed more American troops became steadier and, in game terms, you get a higher proportion of Line which ties in nicely with the British bayonet charge being less effective toward the end of the conflict. Right, well that’s me standing well above the parapet and awaiting the wrath of the more learned worthies :( Regards Paul ............. Hi Paul, As for the British +1 for firing; I can't really say there is great justification for it. We just look at it as a combination of British soldiers skill, British officer's skill and better powder and cartridges in comparison to Ameican (and Hessian) factors. I can live with it. As for Bayonet charges. We find these an absolute MUST when playing BG! Our experience with British trying to force a Rebel position using firepower has been very poor for the British, even against Militia types. We try to get our foot close to charge range, recover some DPs, fire a volley and charge. The charging unit has a lot of advantages in melee and carries the ground more often than not. There is no need to form-up before charging, but recovery of DPs is critical. All in all I think the rules capture all this very well. The only thing I would consider is a DP break for units moving in Open Order something similar to skirmishers. Mike B

Paul and Mike, an interesting discussion. The issue of whether the stereotypical British bayonet charge should be easier to pull off is one that I've thought about quite a bit. Indeed Paul, I think you and I may have discussed it at Long Island last year. On the +1 firing it is simply meant to represent better fire discipline. The ability to start, stop and hold fire better than opponents. I certainly agree with you Paul that if we were to make a change for the bayonet charge it would need to be in morale rules. The effect of this tactic was after all psychological. As Nosworthy and others have pointed out, almost nobody ever waited around to be empaled in someone else's bayonet. Either the defenders ran or attackers faltered before that could happen. Equally, as mike points out, the accrual or not of DPs is something that can have considerable effect on the 'charge home' morale throw. Although there were some circs when the Brits didn't bother with a volley, I think it was standard procedure to give one before charging in. Anyway the rules have already been tweaked to give the assaulting force a better chance: - by allowing approach marches at double speed; - by allowing a 'CinC's charge' in which one unit is led forward in a 'DP proof' fashion; - mike, it's already possible to say that units in Open Order accrue a max of one DP per turn. This is described as scenario-dependent but you could always make it a standard club rule. We could go further: - by saying Militia and Levy units could never remove DPs if they were in charge range of their enemy (ie regardless of whether they had a commander attached) - by allowing the Brits a 'final volley' that would be allowed even if they had used two movement dice that turn. Thoughts gents ? EC

Firstly the book dispels the myth around how effective rebel musketry was but, interestingly, seems to conclude that British musketry was no worse than the rebels. Rebel musketry could be very good; I think that the point Spring was making was that the mythology has inflated its quality to the point where too many people do not (or cannot) distinguish between the individual marksmanship of a skilled handful, and the "jobbing" musketry of a Line or State regiment. When used in a defensive situation, where those dispensing it were in cover of some sort, usually resting their weapons, and often delivering a first volley, every type of Rebel unit did serious damage at some time or another during the war. Equally, every type collapsed/fired high/missed the mark from time to time, as well. As for British musketry, in the early part of the war all units experienced poor fire discipline and accuracy, examples being Lexington and Bunker Hill. As late as 1777, the same was true of the inexperienced units in Burgoyne's army. I did some research on this a while back, and it suggested that British musketry generally inflicted fewer losses than that of their opponents - bear in mind this might not necessarily be due entirely to lack of control/skill, but at least in part because they were always advancing, and not static behind defences. So why do the British get a +1 in firing? I can’t actually believe I am writing this! All my instincts from what I have read, and the few Napoleonic games I have played, led me to accept this without a moments hesitation. There is one justification (and only one, IMO) for a +1 on British musketry, and it is this: the units most commonly employed in battle were the elite of the British Army - the Grenadier and Light Battalions, the Foot Guards, and the better line regiments who either became quasi light infantry, or acquired a deserved reputation as tough nuts (the 5th, 23rd, 24th, 33rd, 42nd, 60th and 71st Foot). Secondly, the bayonet charge. Those of you who have read some of my AAR’s now how reluctant I am to launch a bayonet charge when I can usually disperse the rebels with some nice volleys. Too many things can go badly wrong with a charge whereas if you get a poor volley off it’s not too bad. Now from reading the book I really should be launching charges at the earliest opportunity as the British noticed most rebel troops were very reluctant to stand and usually broke first. Now, to get them to break its best to put a few volleys in to accumulate DP and therefore disorder them. Well, historically, there is nothing wrong with that, if you are gaming certain theatres and/or periods of the war. The attacks/advances by British line regiments at Bunker Hill and Chatterton's Hill/White Plains, or Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights, stalled and/or degenerated into inconclusive firefights. However, “in most battlefield encounters it was un-necessary for the King’s troops to soften up the enemy before attempting to break them with the bayonet.” As the war progressed, this tactic became more and more problematic (and bloody), to the point where any successes were invariably pyrrhic. Also the British don’t appear to have closed up before launching a charge but it is recognised that they would have come off worse against a more compact enemy who stood. IMO, in practice there would be little to choose between a "loose files" two-rank line and a close order two-rank line in a head-on clash. If only the British were moving forward, their impetus would cancel the "solidity" of the opposing line; if the defenders counter-charged, they themselves would "shake out" to some extent. Again, one has to note - as Spring does - that in the vast majority of cases the charging (British) units were the elite of the army, which also made a difference. It seems to me that we need to encourage more British bayonet charges, even in open order, and increase the likelihood of the rebels not standing. That the British were willing to charge in open order speaks of their confidence in the rebels not standing. I have just two small issues with the rules as they stand: one is the range at which cannister can be used (I think it is too short, being only equal to musket range); the other is how easy it is for the British to fail the test for a bayonet charge (er, unless it's just my dice rolling......?). Morale British infantry testing to charge +1 American 2nd Line or militia responding to an infantry charge -1 (or 2?) I would suggest limiting the British +1 to certain units (as discussed above) since we don't really have enough evidence about the ordinary line regiments to make any hard and fast judgments. For the Rebels, the solution is perhaps to be aware of which Continental regiments improved during the war (although very few existed in the same form and with the same personnel, for long enough to establish any sort of reputation), and which State and Militia formations were capable of standing. I would suggest -1 for all Continentals being charged before 1777, and for 2nd Line thereafter; and -2 for all militia other than the handful of units in the Southern campaigns, who were of superior material.

Interesting discussion. I get around the problems mentioned by increasing the +/-'s for the quality of the units. Its not totally accurate but it's a simple solution.

In the morale test, ALL infantry gets -1 for being charged by infantry, therefore get your charge in first. That's what the British did isn't it? John

Ronan wrote IMO, in practice there would be little to choose between a "loose files" two-rank line and a close order two-rank line in a head-on clash. If only the British were moving forward, their impetus would cancel the "solidity" of the opposing line; if the defenders counter-charged, they themselves would "shake out" to some extent. Again, one has to note - as Spring does - that in the vast majority of cases the charging (British) units were the elite of the army, which also made a difference. In the rules though you don't get the charging or British in line modifier if you charge in open order. I think this is probably right as an open order formation appears to have been more vulnerable to a counter attack. What I was hoping to get across was that the British appear happy to risk this because the rebels were seen as so unlikely to stand hence the emphasis on the morale test. Although I like the idea of specific units being graded accordingly not all of us have that knowledge unless imparted from a scenario book. By giving a very general -1 to American 2nd line or worse this makes 2nd line a bit more shaky, militia and levy(who already have a general -1 and -2) even more so. By not including American Line I was assuming these would already represent the best Continental units throughout the conflict. And as these become more prevalent as the war progressed it reflects the reduced effectiveness of the "furious bayonet charge" tactic. John wrote: In the morale test, ALL infantry gets -1 for being charged by infantry, therefore get your charge in first. That's what the British did isn't it? Absolutely but at the moment your American 2nd Line unit has as good a chance at launching a counter charge as a British Line unit charging home. Of course it is up to the player to charge when your opposition has more DP than you but that seems to indicate you should give them a volley or two before charging in and bearing in mind the attacker may have picked up a DP in the advance or during the charge itself. I hope I am not trying to weight this too much in favour of the British as some charges did indeed stall and turn into firefights. I am just wondering why after playing BG for four years why I consider a bayonet charge by the British to be far too risky. the other is how easy it is for the British to fail the test for a bayonet charge (er, unless it's just my dice rolling......?). No Ronan, it's not just you. :( regards Paul

I'm just play testing Guard +3 Elite +2 Line +1 2nd Line -1 Militia - 2 Levy -3 I am using this in conjuction with a base morale of 8 or 9 and using average dice rather than 2D6. No sure about the extreames or the guards catagory, might limit it to Guard Elites.

Paul Assuming that both are on "assault" or the Americans are on "engage" then yes, but, as the American player do you counter-charge or hopefully stand and fire? If the latter can you inflict enough DPs, if you have some of your own through a British volley prior to the charge then your chances are reduced, then you have to hopefully stand with a -1 for being charged and a - for your DPs. Then in melee you will have a big basic minus for not charging, or rather the British get a big plus for charging. Either that or change your dice! John

It's interesting seeing how this debate has gone. People have suggested different approaches but we've still got a couple of problems. - British bayonet charges did fail. Implicitly, the reason Howe had his grenadiers and LI do all the difficult work for him, was because he doubted the ability of his line infantry. From the grenadiers at Bunker's Hill rail fence to Webster's brigade at Guilford there were times when the British charge failed (even if, at GCH, it eventually succeeded...). So we cannot have a solution that more or less gaurantees that the British go in. - similarly, the 'militia' did sometimes stick around. Stark's guys at that same rail fence were one celebrated example but there were others. - I therefore think that a change that altered the average Brits into Americans charge by a factor of more than + or - 1 is not desirable because it would make things too certain. - I like the idea that Militia and Levy might lose their ability to rally off DPs if within charge range of an enemy. But if we deny the likes of a Stark or Morgan a positive effect on their morale, then I fear the atmosphere of the game is altered for the worse. Inspiring leadership should surely have a role ? - Could it simply be a scenario dependent answer we are looking for ? If the Guards, 23rd, 33rd, and 71st are all graded as Elite, for example, doesn't this give them the power to fight this offensive battle and breach three American lines ? There's no doubt, after their 1,000 miles marching with Cornwallis, they were one tough bunch... Equally British troops in other scenarios can be (and sometimes are) bumped up to Elite. It's perfectly fair in my view for the 42nd and 33rd in the 1776 campaign to get this, or the 24th at Saratoga. I'm still not sure we've got a better solution... EC

Agreed that British bayonet charges did fail. I also agree that we need to retain the militia/levy ability to rally off with an officer for the very reason mentioned. I still favour a blanket -1 for American 2nd line, or worse, which does not improve the British ability to charge home. But will reduce the poorer American units ability to stand if such a charge is pressed home. If I recall correctly(miles from rule book) testing in response comes after the charge home. The secondary result of this is the British players might then be tempted to launch a charge in open order( which they apparently did) but under the present rules is a very risky business if it comes to a melee. regards Paul

Paul, do I take it then that you're suggesting -1 for American morale and melee ? Or is this purely training grade dependent ? EC

Just a couple of observations on the last few posts: 1) Failed British bayonet charges: those that occured during the early part of the war (typified by the Grenadier Battalion at Breed's Hill and the 2nd Brigade at Chatterton's Hill/White Plains) were almost entirely due to poor fire discipline, a "wrinkle" that had been pretty much ironed out by the start of the 1777 campaign and which - to the best of my knowledge - didn't happen again. 2) The GCH incident involved an extremely rare occurence (in any H&M conflict) of one unit fighting its way through two previous lines of defenders, only to be presented with a third that was composed of the enemy's best troops - so an "oh @&$* - not another one!" response is perhaps understandable! Again, it is difficult to think of a similar failure in another major action. Perhaps we should make charges harder, at least for line battalions, in 1775 and 1776, and easier thereafter? Whilst I take the point that it should not be guaranteed, I think the rules as they stand at present do make charging home slightly more of a lottery for the Regulars than it was historically. We're in the right zone, it's a question of tweaking rather than re-thinking. 3) Stark generally commanded better quality troops - his NH contingent at Breed's Hill was composed of Minute Men (including many F&I vets), and the militia units at Bennington were all volunteers. In between, he led NH Continentals, who were generally good troops (even if they were among the most poorly clothed in Washington's army). 4) Morgan's strength was in working out how best to use crappy troops and his opponent's weakness (what a great "rules lawyer" he'd have made!). I think the answer here is a combination of scenario-specific grading of both troops and leaders, as EC suggest.

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